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ABSTRACT
Managing risk is one of the main activities of venture capital companies. Despite the fact that this topic
is of high practical relevance, only little research was published on risk management performed by
venture capital companies in their ventures. Hence, we conducted a structured literature review which
was the basis for developing five hypotheses concerning measures to decrease failure risk in venture
capital-backed ventures. We tested these hypotheses with an empirical data set of 93 venture capitalbacked ventures in Germany using original deal data from nine different venture capital funds using a
structural equation model. We showed that the experience and the skills of the corresponding investment
manager have a significant negative impact on the failure risk of a venture. Investment manager´s
experience and skills were measured by the working and founding experience, the technology expertise
and the network size. Hence, the results emphasize the importance of the selection of the investment
manager for risk management in venture capital investments.
Keywords: Risk management, failure risk, venture capital, new-technology-based firms
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I.
Introduction
Risk management can add value and is necessary in all types of companies to
secure long-term stability (Frooth et al., 1993; Mackay and Moeller, 2007).
Nevertheless, the topic of risk management is still in its infancy as articles are mainly
published in finance and accounting, but less in management or entrepreneurship
journals (Bromiley et al., 2015). Especially venture capital (VC) investments are well
known as high risk investments since venture capital companies (VCCs) invest in
ventures with a high growth but also high risk potential (LiPuma and Park, 2014).
Young entrepreneurial firms face the challenge of “liability of newness” resulting in
particular difficulties, e.g. shorter expected life, and a greater risk of failure (Ang, 1992;
Coleman, 2004).
In the investment decision making process, VCC are often faced with
uncertainty about the future performance of the venture and the adverse selection
problem. The reason for that is that VCC have to rely on information about the
venture supplied by the entrepreneur (Tourani-Rad and England, 2003). A
comparative study by Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) showed that VC investments fail at
a rate of 35 to 55 per cent. Young and entrepreneurial firms are an essential part of the
German economy and an important source for innovation in order to stay competitive
on a global basis. Hence, research on comprehensive risk management for the VC
industry is of great practical importance to improve the practices how German VCCs
pursue risk management which might reduce the risk of failure of their ventures.
Risk management pursued in VC-backed ventures is only moderately
researched in academic literature (Yoshikawa et al., 2004; Tan et al., 2008). Previous
studies either focus on single types of risk, e.g. macro-risk (Ning et al., 2015) or
liquidity risk (Cumming et al., 2005) or on specific types of risk management
measures, e.g. syndication (Wang et al., 2012), (Hopp, 2010) or financial contracting
and incentive mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Studies analyzing comprehensive sets of
risk management measures applied by VCCs ventures are limited (see e.g. Kut et al.,
2006; Kut et al., 2007; Kut and Smolarski, 2006 and Smolarski et al., 2005). These
studies used comparable methods and similar samples leading to a lack of new findings
(Dimov and Murray, 2008; Milavo and Fernhaber, 2009). However, risk management
is one of the core competencies of VCC and therefore a highly relevant topic in
practice. One reason for the limited amount of studies in this field might be the lack of
reliable data. VC-backed ventures are private companies and only limited subject to the
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duty of publishing company data and financial statements (Bygrave, 2006; Neergaard
and Ulhoi, 2006).
To analyze risk management measures and their impact on the failure risk of
VC-backed ventures we pursued the following research strategy: We conducted a
structured literature review to develop five hypotheses on risk management measures
applied by VCC in ventures, i.e. the assessment and evaluation of new ventures,
contracts, investment manager´s experience and skills, governance mechanisms and
management support. These hypotheses were tested with a structural equation model
using an empirical data set of 93 VC-backed ventures in Germany from nine different
VC funds.
As risk management received relatively little attention in entrepreneurship
literature (Pinkwart, 2002) and is an important research topic, but largely unsystematic
and not easy to diversify (Manigart et al., 2002), we add to literature and practice as
follows:
1. We used a rare data set with in-depth quantitative and qualitative data from
nine public and private VC funds combining data obtained from a survey with
investment managers and original deal documents like business plans, investment
committee papers, reporting and annual statements.
2. We provide an analysis of the Germany VC market which was rather
moderately studied in literature before. Thereby, we shed light into the risk
management practices of German VC funds.
3. The results from our structural equation model imply that particularly
investment manager´s experience and skills have a statistically significant impact to
reduce failure risk in VC-backed ventures. This finding supports Hopp and Lukas
(2014) who were among the first showing that investment managers can have
technological, industry, financial and managerial experience and leadership skills which
might be crucial for the success and failure ventures. Furthermore, governance
mechanisms, e.g. milestones and reporting, were heavily applied by all VCC. However,
contrary to other studies like Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008) we
cannot show that governance mechanisms have a significant effect on reducing the risk
of venture´s failure.
II.

Literature review and hypothesis development

Risk can be defined as the probability and severity of adverse effects (Aven,
2011). Therefore, risk management is crucial to manage the uncertainty of risks. A
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sound risk management is characterized as proactive, aligned and economic including
the identification, estimation, evaluation, treatment and monitoring of possible
negative influences on performance (Hain, 2011). VCC are financial intermediaries
investing foremost in ventures bridging the gap created by the shortage of appropriate
financing for small and entrepreneurial firms (LiPuma and Park, 2014; Okpala, 2012).
By investing in ventures VCC bear high risk due to information asymmetries between
the investor and entrepreneur known as the principal agent problem (LiPuma and
Park, 2014). Hence, VCC apply different types of risk management measures to reduce
the risk of the investment. Risk management in VC-backed ventures was sparsely
analyzed in academic literature (Yoshikawa et al., 2004; Tan et al., 2008). The studies
of Kut et al. (2006), Kut et al. (2007), Smolarski et al. (2005) investigated how buyout and VC funds in Europe overall, in India, UK, France and Germany manage risk
in the pre-screening phase of the investment, in existing ventures, the portfolio risk and
macro risk considering a comprehensive set of risk management measures. These
studies showed first attempts to analyze a set of risk management measures.
Nevertheless, the studies are subject to several limitations especially due to partially
small samples.
We conducted a structured literature review to study the current state of
academic literature on the topic of risk management in VC-backed ventures. First, we
analyzed all entrepreneurship journals ranked in the 55th edition of the Journal
Quality List edited by Prof. Anne-Wil Harzing from 2005 to 2015 regarding the
keywords “risk”, “risk management”, “venture capital” and “failure”. We identified
thirteen relevant studies. Second, we searched in the EBSCOhost Online Research
Databases for the abovementioned keywords in the titles and abstracts of all types of
academic journals from 2005 to 2015. Overall, we identified 17 relevant papers (see
Appendix A, Table 4). The samples of the different studies vary greatly in size and data
collection method. A considerable number of studies are of explorative nature due to
partly small sample sizes. This implies that this field of research is relatively unexplored
offering room for further research. The majority of papers used data from the US and
in some cases parts of Europe or Asia. Only few studies were conducted in Germany.
A.
Risk types in VC-backed ventures
VC investments are subject to several risks. Our structured literature review
showed that academic scholars investigated agency risk, financial or liquidity risk,
technology risk, market risk, human resources risk, internationalization risk and macro
risk. In the following, the different types of risks are described.
Agency risk is often stated as the major risk for VCC due potential problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard between entrepreneurs and VCC (Bengtsson and
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Sensoy, 2011; Lu et al., 2006; Tan et al., 2008). The theory was developed by William
Meckling, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen depicting the conflict of interest between
the principal and the agent, in the case of VC founders or managers of the venture and
the VCC (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mechanisms like
financial contracting, milestones, gradual provision of capital and active involvement in
the board are applied by venture capitalists to overcome the information asymmetry
between the VCCs and the entrepreneur (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Lu et al., 2006;
Tan et al., 2008).
Liquidity or financial risks are partially used as synonyms in academic literature.
Kut et al. (2006), Kut et al. (2007), Smolarski et al. (2005) classified financial risk in
their analysis on the level of the portfolio and macro economy. Contrary, liquidity risk
was analyzed by Cumming et al. (2005) indicating that VCC adjust their investment
decisions according to liquidity risk. Liquidity risk refers according to Cumming et al.
(2005) to the exit risk for the VCC in IPO markets describing the risk of not being
able to reach an exit in a proper way. The study showed that VCC prefer to invest in
high-tech and early stage ventures to defer the exit and increases the syndication size
(Cumming et al., 2005). In our analysis, we define liquidity or financial risk as the risk
of the venture to become illiquid or even bankrupt.
Technology risk is often used synonymously as product risk, technological risk or
technical risk in academic literature. Assessing the technology or product risk is crucial
risk for VCC before investing in ventures due to the fact that technologies and
products are often not market-ready. Technology due diligences, syndication and the
opinions of investment managers with industry experience are used to overcome the
risk associated with technologies and products (Kut et al., 2006; Kut et al., 2007;
Smolarski et. al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012).
Market risk is mainly related to the commercialization of a new technology
(Wang et al., 2012). Ventures often lack the marketing capabilities necessary to take
the technology to market (Wang et al., 2012). VCC apply due diligences to assess the
market risk as a central part of the investment decision process (Lu et al., 2006).
Furthermore, VCC utilize their network and skills to foster the market introduction.
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) major market risks are market size and
growth, competition and barriers to entry and the likelihood of customer adoption.
However, the results indicated that competition, market size and customer adoption
risks mentioned at a moderate rate of 40, 31 and 22 per cent in the investment
documents (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002).
Human resources risks are risks associated with the quality and capabilities of the
management of the venture. This was analyzed by the studies of Kut et al. (2006), Kut
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et al. (2007) and Smolarski et al. (2005). In these studies human resources risk was
measured by the lack of management performance and the lack of management focus.
To mitigate the risk related to the management, VCC can verify the track record of the
management team and can invest in management teams which are previously known
(Kut et al., 2007). Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) showed that risks associated with the
management were mentioned in 61% of the analyses. It was documented that the CEO
is a “difficult” person, that the management lacks in financial planning, the
management is not able to focus or that the management is young and inexperienced
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). In addition, a further risky issue for VCC is an
incomplete management team (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). Overall, the results
indicate that risks associated with human capital are of high relevance for VCC.
LiPuma and Park studied the special topic of internationalization risk using
longitudinal data of 962 invested rounds in 334 VC-backed ventures (LiPuma and
Park, 2014). Variables for risk management were round size, round interval and round
syndication. Compared to solely domestic ventures, VCC use smaller syndicates and
provide smaller and less frequent rounds of capital for ventures which internationalize
opportunistically (LiPuma and Park, 2014).
Volatility and macroeconomic drivers, namely macro risk, affect VC
investments by the total amount, by the number of deals, and by the average amount
per deal (Ning et al., 2015). Types of macro risk can be inflation risk, business-cycle
risk, interest rate risk and foreign exchange rate risk (Kut et al., 2006). Therefore, in
times of high macro risk VCC adapt their risk preferences and investment strategies by
investing in fewer deals with a smaller average amount per deal, raising their
investments in later investment stages and injecting a lower percent of cash in the first
several financing sequences (Ning et al., 2015).
Failure risk as one of the most severe risks for VCC was not contained in the
results of our structured literature review. In a further search we explored that only very
few researchers studied this topic empirically (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006). Therefore,
we focused in our analysis on this type of risk since failure risk consists partially of the
above mentioned risk types according to insolvency literature (Carter and van Auken,
2006), (Davila et al., 2003), (Headd, 2003), (Pinkwart et al., 2015), (Pleschak, 2002),
(Schilling, 2002), namely liquidity risk, market risk, human resources risk and
technology risk. Therefore we include these risk factors as variables in our model to
describe failure risk.
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B.
Risk management in VC-backed firms
The literature review has shown that VCC apply the following risk
management measures: 1) assessment and evaluation of new ventures (Kut et al., 2007;
Lu et al., 2006), 2) governance (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Tan et al., 2008) and 3)
contracting (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Kut et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008). In the
course of the interviews with practitioners we identified two further influencing factor
to reduce risk in VC investments, investment manager´s experience and skills as well as
management support. There might be some interactions between the different risk
management measures, e.g. governance mechanisms and management support. In the
context of support functions of VCC governance mechanisms are a part of the support
functions. However, in this context we separated governance mechanisms from
management support due to the fact that governance mechanisms belong to the most
important risk management measures in VC deals.
Assessing and evaluating potential new investments are the first steps of risk
management VCC can apply in the investment process. Kut et al. (2007) showed that
risk management in evaluating new investments is a well-developed area in practice in
the VC industry (Kut et al., 2007). VCC have a variety of tools to assess and evaluate
potential investment targets regarding risk and return, e.g. performing different types of
due diligences like financial, product, market, customer, legal, competitor analysis
internally and externally and analyzing audited financial statements (Kut et al., 2007;
Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Lu et al., 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005). Information
asymmetries can for example be resolved through the overall coherence of the business
plan and the VCC’s own due diligence report according to Tourani-Rad and England
(2003). VCC can also check the risk associated with the management by verifying the
track record of the management team and board members and performing criminal
background checks (Kut et al., 2007; Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005).
Further measures to be conducted before an investment decision is made can be the
consideration of synergies with existing ventures and the risk preferences of the
investors of the fund (Kut et al., 2007; Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et al.,
2005). We assume that a better assessment of the risk before investing might lead to a
lower failure rate of VC-backed venture.
Hypotheses 1: A high effort in assessing and evaluating the investment is
negatively related to failure risk of VC-backed ventures.
Financial contracting can be used by VCC as a protection against downside risk
(Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011; Kut et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008), but also to generate
value in portfolio companies by mitigating the agency problem with financial contracts
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2002). Financial contracting is one measure next to active
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involvement (Kut et al., 2007) and direct monitoring to reduce information
asymmetry, motivational and financials problems (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011). VCC
apply financial contracting mechanisms like liquidation preference, anti-dilution rights,
cumulative dividends, redemption rights, participation rights and pay-to-play
provisions according to Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008).
Syndication is a common measure in the VC industry to team up for assessing and
investing collaboratively ventures to share the risk (Hopp, 2010; Hopp and Lukas,
2014; Smolarski et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012). Staged financing is a useful control
mechanism for VCC to gather information and monitor the progress of the venture
having the option to inject further capital when milestones are reached and periodically
abandon the venture (Kut and Smolarski, 2006; Tan et al., 2008). Adding to this,
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) identified that good governance abilities can be a
substitute for measures of financial contracting. Therefore, we state that a high use of
contracting mechanisms might lower the risk of failure of VC-backed firms:
Hypothesis 2: An extensive use of contracting mechanisms is negatively related
to the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.
VCC are known as active investors in their ventures. Risk management
mechanisms related to governance like milestones, reporting and an active involvement
in the board are applied by VCC to reduce agency risk. This risk type describes the
interest conflict in the relationship between the investor and the entrepreneur. A
considerable amount of studies investigated how VCC use control and incentive
mechanisms to enhance the firm’s performance and receive higher returns. Contrary,
only a few studies focused on this topic to reduce downside or failure risk (Bengtsson
and Sensoy, 2011; Tan et al., 2008). According to Tan et al. (2008) governance risk
management measures can be distinguished in either control mechanisms like
monitoring (e.g. reporting, frequency of interaction, convertible securities), staged
investments, which we allocated to financial contracting, and the allocation of
ownership and control rights or incentive mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Shares of
stock rights of the entrepreneur and employee stock options are incentive mechanisms
to reduce agency risk. The greater VCC´s monitoring abilities, the more effective is the
monitoring at constraining the entrepreneur´s behavior (Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2011).
From practice, we know that all VCC use control mechanism, hence we assume:
Hypothesis 3: The extensive use of governance mechanisms are negatively
related to the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.
Investment managers are responsible for assessing new ventures and investment
decisions in the pre-investment phase as well as the management of existing ventures in
the post-investment phase, i.e. communication, meetings, controlling and supporting

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 18, No. 2 • Summer 2016

9

the venture. Investment managers can have technological, industry, financial and
managerial experience and leadership skills which might be crucial for the success and
failure ventures (Hopp and Lukas, 2014). According to Hopp and Lukas (2014) more
experienced investment managers control their investments less often than less
experiences investors. Furthermore, more industry experience allows less frequent and
intense evaluation (Hopp and Lukas, 2014). Yazdipour and Constand (2010) argued
that researchers cannot ignore the human/managerial/decision-making side in failure
prediction. Hence, they suggest in human decisions about the making or breaking of a
private company a shifts from the commerce/operational (effect) side of failure analysis
to the human/managerial/decision making (cause) side of it (Yazdipour and Constand,
2010). We assume that an experienced investment manager can be better in assessing
risk and using countermeasures which can lead to a lower failure risk of VC-backed
firms:
Hypothesis 4: The degree of investment manager´s experience is negatively
related to the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.
A variety of studies proved that VCC add value to their portfolio companies
(Alperovych and Hübner, 2013; Manigart et al., 2002; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al.,
1996) by applying different types of value added services like financials, governance,
strategy, operational improvements and human capital improvements (Bottazzi et al.,
2002; Cumming et al., 2005; Guo and Jiang, 2013; Tang et al., 2014; Timmons and
Bygrave, 1986). We transferred the positive effects from management support to the
literature of risk management in the VC industry. Hence, we assume that management
support can have an impact on the failure risk of VCC´s portfolio companies:
Hypothesis 5: The extensive use of management support provided by VCC is
negatively related to the failure risk of VCC´s portfolio companies.

III.

Data and method

A.
Sample
Our sample consists of 93 VC-backed firms collected from nine different
public and private public partnership VC funds in Germany. Considering the statistics
of the Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften, which recorded 433
seed investments in Germany from 2005 to 2010, our sample covers 21.5% of the seed
investments in this time frame in Germany. We conducted a survey with the
corresponding investment managers. In addition, we had access to the original deal
documents including the business plans, investment committee papers, reporting and

10

Proksch, Stranz, Pinkwart & Schefczyk • Risk Management

annual statements of the investments. That enabled us to collect in-depth quantitative
and qualitative data.
Considering our data set, the VC-backed firms are on average 4.6 years old at
the time of data collection. In the seed round the firms received on average 784,487
Euros as investment and in the series A round 1,202,948 Euros (see table 1). The firms
in our data set are technology-based firms as they operate in the industries information
technology and automation (39 %), life science (34%), material science (9 %), energy
(5 %), communication (4 %) and others (9 %).

Table 1. Overview of our data set
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev

Age of ventures

4.59 years

5

2.09

Size of founders team

2.85 founders

3

1.13

Number of founding
rounds

1.98 rounds

2

0.89

Investment sum Seed

784,487 Euro

644,109 Euros

519,577

Investment sum Series A

1,202,948 Euros

816,287 Euros

1,179,085

Number of investors Seed

2.55

2

1.98

Number of investors
Series A

3.94

3

2.54

B.
Measures and variables
We used a structural equation model approach to build and test our model
because failure risk can hardly be measured directly. Hence, we used a set of proxy
variables. We built a partial least squares (PLS) model because of its suitability for
proxy variables and the lack of existing scales in this field of research (Ainudding et al.,
2007; Henseler et al., 2009). Furthermore, the fit of PLS models compared to
covariance based methods for sample sizes smaller than 100 also attributed to our
choice (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). Not all of our items follow normal distribution.
Hence, they would have been omitted once using a covariance based approach. In PLS
models items do not have to follow a certain distribution (Hulland, 1999). In addition,
we use variables measured with a 5-point Likert scale in our model. PLS models
support the use of nominal, ordinal and interval scaled data (Fornell and Bookstein,
1982, Nitzl, 2010; see also Menzar and Nigh, 1995, Brinckmann et al., 2011). We

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 18, No. 2 • Summer 2016

11

decided to use a reflective measurement model for the outer constructs of the risk
management measures, the control variables and the construct of business failure as
well as for the inner construct for two reasons. Reflective measurement models have
defined reliability test criteria and are well researched (Roy and Tarafdar, 2012).
Further, our indicator variables strongly correlate within our construct.
1.

Dependent variables

Measuring failure risk of a company is difficult. Therefore, we measure failure
risk by proxy variables, namely human resource risk, technology risk, financial risk and
market risk based on the literature of bankruptcy and insolvency (Pinkwart et al.,
2015). Pinkwart et al. (2005) showed that 80 per cent of the reasons for failure include
a lack of management companies or management companies. Other studies confirmed
human resources as an important reason for business failure (Carter and van Auken,
2006; Headd, 2003). A further cause of failure is risk related to the technology of a
venture (Schilling, 2002). These companies are dependent on developing their
technology to a working and marked-proved product. If ventures do not succeed in
reaching the market readiness in a timely manner development costs can grow in
outstanding way which ventures often cannot afford (Pleschak et al., 2002). Difficulties
in getting a follow-up financing, miscalculation for the capital need and bad planning
are among the most common reasons for business failure, namely financial risk (Davila
et al., 2003; Headd, 2003; Pleschak et al., 2002; Thornhill and Amit, 2003). New
ventures often need too long to break even or even fail because of the lack of financial
resources. A further reason for the failure of companies can be found in the area of the
market. Problems with the market entry or in marketing and sales are among the most
common reasons of failure (Wagner, 1994; Dowling and Drumm, 2002; Pleschak,
2002). This can be explained by a lack of experience in marketing and sales as well as
an overoptimistic planning (Hall, 1992; Thornhill and Amit, 2003). In addition, new
companies often rely on a few key clients leading to a strong dependency from these
customers (Brüderl et al., 1996; Guggemoos, 2012). We measured the five above
mentioned risk types by the assessment of the supervising investment managers on a
scale from 1 to 5 (1: very low risk, 5: very high risk).
2.

Independent variables

As mentioned in chapter II. B. we identified five groups of risk management
measures applied by VCC, i.e. assessment and evaluation of new ventures, contracting,
governance, investment managers’ experience and skills and management support.
Each group was measured by different items since VCC use several risk management
measures for each group comprehensively in practice.
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We used different items to measure the degree of assessment. We first looked if
an external assessment of the company was done. From the VCC documents we knew
that often external companies are hired to evaluate e.g. technology, market and legal
risks. Further, we looked at the intellectual property protection. If the technology is
protected by e.g. patents or registered designs the market and technology risks might be
lower. In addition, we measured if the VCC relied on their network in assessing the
technology and the competencies of the founders.
Contracts handle different aspects of risks between the entrepreneur and the
VCC. An important item is liquidation preference. A high liquidation preference
lowers the risk of VCC as it minimizes possible losses. We analyzed how strongly a
liquidation preference was used. Further, we measured the number of syndication
partners. Syndication is a possibility to share risk with other investors. Further, we
looked at the investment sum. If the investment sum is lower it might increase the risk
of failure in terms of liquidity. In addition we intended to measure if staged financing
was used. However, due to the fact that this was the case for all our cases we did not
include this item in our model.
Governance mechanisms like reporting and milestones are useful to assess risks
continuously. To measure governance we included five proxy variables in our model.
At first we looked if milestones were used and monitored. VCC often use milestones to
bind founders to certain goals. If milestones are reached, founders receive the full
investment sum. In addition, we looked at reporting. From expert interviews we knew
that successful companies report regularly. If the company does not perform as
expected, reporting rates might decrease. We therefore measured how heavily VCC rely
on reporting. Furthermore, we included personal exchange in our model as it indicates
a high interaction between founders and investment managers. Fourthly, we included
the variable information through network in our model. According to principal agent
theory a conflict exists between founders and VCC due to information asymmetry.
Therefore, if VCC use their network to lower information asymmetries risks might be
reduced. Lastly, we investigated at the shares of the founders. If the founders still have a
high share of equity they might be more motivated financially and incentivized even if
they lost decision rights due to the contract with the VCC.
Investment manager´s experience and skills might have a significant influence
on the failure risk of ventures. We described the experience and skills of the investment
manager by five variables. First, we looked at the working experience. More working
experience might make it easier to deal in business environment. Second, we assessed
the founding experience. Third, we analyzed the expertise with the field of technology.
Forth, we assessed the business skills of the investment manager. An investment
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manager has to have a profound understanding of business to be able to evaluate the
development of the ventures. Lastly, we analyzed the network size. With a superior
network, the investment manager has more possibilities to get additional knowledge
and support for areas he is not an expert on.
We measured the degree of management support by six variables. Firstly, we
looked at the support by the VCC using own competencies. Bringing in their
experience in the company might lead to better development of the portfolio company.
Further, we looked at sales support. Young companies often fail because of a lack of
sales activities. A support in the area could possibly lead to a lower risk of failure.
Thirdly, we analyzed support with technology. For new ventures technology is a crucial
success factor. Fourthly, we examined strategic support. A strong strategy is often an
indicator for successful firms. In addition, we looked at support in follow-up financing.
For new ventures it is critical to raise additional financing in a timely manner to avoid
illiquidity and bankruptcy. Lastly, we measured the use of network in general to lower
the risk of the venture after the investment took place. Networks might be useful to get
new customers or consultants for solving issues.
3.

Control variables

We controlled for age and industry. The risk of failure might be higher when
companies are younger. Albach (1987) suggested that for most companies the highly
probable chance of failure ends after five years. In addition, some industries might have
higher failure rate than others.
IV.

Results

A.
Descriptive statistics
The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in appendix B (see Table
5). The failure risk was measures on a 5-point Likert scale (1: very low, 5 very high).
The statistics show that liquidity risk has the highest value of 3.652 at the lowest
standard deviation of 1.152. Technology risk was rated on average at 2.711 depicting
the lowest failure of risk measures, but at the highest standard deviation of 1.455.
The descriptive statistics for the five groups of risk management present that
governance mechanisms like milestones (mean = 4.247) or reporting (mean= 4.355) at
a standard deviation of below 0.8 were deployed consistently high by the VCC in our
sample. The same applies for risk management like obtaining references of founders
(mean=4.086), liquidation preference (mean= 4.096) or support in follow up financing
(mean= 4.065).
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B.
Results of structural equation model
The resulting path model is shown in table 2. The degree of assessment and
evaluating new ventures has no significant influence on the failure risk. The t-statistic is
not significant on a 95 per cent level for this construct. Therefore, we rejected H1.
Looking at contracting, we found no significance due to low t-statistics. Hence,
we rejected H2.
Governance is not significant considering the low t-statistics. Therefore, we
rejected H3.
Our results show a high impact of investment manager´s experience and skills
on failure risk of VC-backed firms. This is indicated by the high factor loading as well
as the high value of the t-statistics. The connotation of the loading is negative stating
that a high experience leads to low risk. Thus, we accepted H4.
Management support is highly significant. Therefore, we accept H5. However
the sign is surprisingly positive.
Table 2. Reliability measure of the PLS model
Significance of * 90 % level, ** 95 % level, *** 99 % level
Construct
Assessment
and evaluation
of
new
ventures
Contracting

Loadings

t-Statistics

0.157

1.559

Cronbach’s
alpha

AVE

Composite
reliability
1

1

f²

q²

1

0.030

0.012

0.194

1.239

1

1

1

0.039

0.006

Investment
Manager´s
experience and
skills

-0.273

2.046**

0.682

0.806

0.511

0.088

0.014

Governance
mechanisms

-0.224

1.300

0.705

0.818

0.604

0.037

0.012

Management
support

0.451

3.219**

1

1

1

0.241

0.05

-

-

0.715

0.823

0.540

Failure risk

The control variables, age and industry, had no significant effect. We therefore
removed them from the final model.
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C.
Results of inner models
In the following, we looked at the indicator variables of the single constructs.
The indicator loadings and t-statistics are shown in table 3. Looking at the construct
assessment and evaluating ventures the only significant variable was expert assessment.
IP protection, references for technology and references for founders are not significant.
Analyzing the construct contracting only liquidation preference is significant. We
omitted the items syndication partner, investment sum and shares of investors. All
items except of business skills were relevant when we looked at the construct
investment manager´s experience and skills. In the construct governance mechanisms
all variables were significant.
Looking at the construct business failure all variables were significant and had a
high factor loading. The factor loading was above 0.6 for all our variables which is an
acceptable value (Hair et al., 2013). This showed the validity of our approach to
measure failure risk by using the four most important risks of bankruptcy.
Table 3. Loadings and t-statistics of the items
Significance of * 90 % level, ** 95 % level, *** 99 % level
Item

Loadings

t-Statistics

Assessment and
evaluation of
new ventures
Evaluation

Loadings

t-Statistics

1

-

HR risk

0.624

3.695**

Liquidity risk

0.775

9.426**

Management
support
1

-

Contracting
Liquidation

Item

Use of Contacts
Failure

1

-

Investment
Manager´s
experience and
skills
Working
experience

0.797

2.258**

Market risk

0.701

5.126**

Founding
experience

0.705

2.957**

Technology risk

0.823

7.904**

Network size

0.623

1.976**

Technology
expertise

0.722

2.066**

Governance
mechanisms

16

Proksch, Stranz, Pinkwart & Schefczyk • Risk Management

Milestones

0.883

2.926**

Information
through
network

0.663

2.231**

Reporting

0.770

2.828**

D.
Reliability measures
We followed the framework of Hair et al. (2013) to assess the reliability of the
PLS model. We therefore looked separately at the structural model and the
measurement model.
1.

Reliability measures of structural model

The R² of our model was 0.282 which is an acceptable value (Huber et al.,
2007; Nitzl, 2010). The Q² value was greater than zero and therefore indicates a
predictive relevance of the model (Henseler et al., 2009). The effect size of the
constructs contracting, investment manager´s experience and skills, governance and
support were above 0.02 showing a weak effect. The effect size of the construct
assessment and evaluation of new ventures was below 0.02. This is not surprising as the
t-test is not significant and the factor loading is below 0.2. The predictive relevance for
the construct investment manager´s experience and skills is weak stated by a value
above 0.02. The value for predictive relevance for the constructs is below 0.02
indicating a low predictive relevance. We choose to include the constructs in the model
due to the explorative nature of the study.
2.

Reliability measures of inner model

Indicators with a loading below 0.4 were stepwise removed so that only
indicators with a standardized indicator loading above this value were included in the
model. This is an acceptable approach according to Henseler et al. (2009) and Hair et
at. (2013). All indicators are significant on a 95 per cent level determined by the tstatics. The internal consistency reliability was measured by Cronbach’s alpha and
composite reliability. The value for Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.6, which is
permissible (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). The composite reliability was above 0.7
for all the constructs (see table 2), which is an acceptable value (Henseler et al., 2009;
Hair et al., 2013). The average variance accepted (AVE) was used to measure the
convergent validity. This approach is widely accepted in literature (Fornell and Larcker,
1981; Hair et al., 2013). All the measures were above 0.5 showing an excellent value.
We used Fornell-Larcker criterion results, cross loadings and heterotrait-monotrait
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ratio of correlations (HTMT) to test for discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker,
1981; Ringle et al., 2015). The model passed all three tests as described in the appendix
C.
V.

Discussion and conclusion

Based on a structured literature review, the analysis of qualitative data of nine
VC funds and an empirical analysis using a structural equation model we studied five
groups of risk management measures VCCs can partake in their ventures to reduce
failure risk. We empirically tested the relevance for each group of risk management
measures. As a result, we show which risk management measures have an influence on
business failure of VC-backed ventures.
First, the assessment of the investment prior the decision had no significant
influence to reduce the failure risk in VCC´s ventures in the model. Therefore, we
cannot support the studies of Kut et al. (2007), Kut and Smolarski (2006), Lu et al.
(2006), Smolarski et al. (2005) and Tourani-Rad and England (2003) showing the
significant relevance of assessment and evaluation in the pre-investment phase. One
reason might be that this is often seen as the most important part in the investment
decision process. The usage of different assessment methods was high for all cases in the
sample (see descriptive statistics in A1), which confirms Kut et al. (2007) that risk
management in evaluating new investments is a well-developed area in practice in the
VC industry. However, the difference between the usages within the ventures might
not be very high resulting in no significant influence.
Second, the construct contracting is not significant. Hence, we cannot support
the results of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011), Kut et al. (2007) and Tan et al. (2008)
that financial contracting can be used by VCC as a protection against downside risk. A
reason for that could be that VCC use similar formats of contracting, which also can be
seen in the descriptive statistics (A1). In addition, all VCC used staged financing,
syndication and milestone with each venture. This implies no significant differences
across the cases in the sample.
Third, the results show that governance mechanisms are not significant to
reduce failure risk in the model. The descriptive statistics showed that governance
mechanisms are extensively used in all ventures supporting no significance of the
statistical results (see Appendix A). Considering this result, we cannot support
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008) who found significant evidence for
the importance of governance mechanisms in VC risk management.
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The construct investment manager´s experience and skills as a risk management
measure in VC-backed ventures are significant, which was rarely discussed in literature
before. This finding continuous the discussion of Hopp and Lukas (2014) who were
among the first showing that investment managers have various competencies, skills
and experiences which might be crucial for the success and failure ventures. Also, the
study of Yazdipour and Constand (2010) highlighted the importance of human capital
in failure prediction of private firms. If the investment manager is more experienced the
VC-backed ventures have less failure risk as the investment manager might be able to
uncover possible problematic issues earlier and use the right countermeasures. In
addition, we found that also VC-backed ventures supported by investment managers
with founding experience have a lesser risk of failure.
Last, we found that management support is significant. Counter-intuitively, the
connotation is negative. The extensive use of management support leads to a higher
risk. This might be a chicken-and-egg problem. Possibly, investors only extensively
support their portfolio companies when risk is already high which might be too late to
save the company. To test this assumption we created a PLS model to analyze the
influence of business failure on the degree of management support. We found that a
high chance of business failure has a positive impact on the degree of management
support as described by the use of VCC´s network and bringing external consultants
into the portfolio company. Therefore, we can assume that this result might be
explained by a chicken-egg problem. Considering this problem in the study, we
recommend further investigation on the use of the risk management measures in the
VC industry. It would be interesting to analyze if risk mitigation measures are only
used when a risk occurred or also in a preemptive way.
VI.

Limitations and implications

A.
Limitations
Like most empirical studies the research is subject to several limitations. First,
we could not assess all risk management measures identified in literature. A holistic
model including further risk management measures could lead to additional results.
Secondly, we used a self-assessment of the investment manager for their
experience in a survey. This might introduce a possible bias. However, the survey
covered a variety of different areas of VC financing wherefore it was not clear for the
investment managers that a connection between their experience and the risk was
made.
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Thirdly, we focused on German technology start-ups from public and private
VC funds. It is unclear if the results can be generalized to other countries and all types
of new ventures. Therefore, similar studies, e.g. using data in the US or Asia, might
uncover similarities and differences between risk management measures across
countries.
The data set consists of a higher share of public as well as public private
partnership funds which also could include a possible bias as public funds might pursue
a different investment and risk management strategy as private funds.
The quantitative approach does not allow to further study changes in the
perceived failure risk over time. A qualitative approach to explicitly study the
development of the risks in different investment stages could further yield to new
results.
In addition, the use of PLS does not allow to control for endogeneity effects
which is also discussed in current literature (Ronko and Evermann, 2013; Henseler et
al., 2014).
The results might be partially biased due to the fact that our sample includes
VC investments from 2005 - 2010, i.e. during the financial crisis. It might be possible
that risks were higher during that time because of the economic downturn and the
restricted capital situation.
B.
Implications
Our research has several implications for the literature and practice.
In terms of the literature, the analysis has shown that the research stream of risk
management in VC investments is rather underdeveloped, but nevertheless of great
practical importance, for VCCs. We tested the effectiveness of different risk
management measures on lowering the risk of business failure in new ventures.
Thereby, we showed the importance of risk management on the probability of failure.
With this article we aim to encourage discussions on and analyses of this field of
literature to shed more light on VCC risk management practices. The results indicate
the relevance of the investment manager in risk management in VC investments.
Continuing this discussion, a possible research question could be which experiences,
skills and knowledge as well as what kind of interaction between founders lowers
venture´s failure risk. Another research direction might be a cross-country analysis as
there are several differences, e.g. legal, between European and US VCCs. The German
law for asset management companies like VCC prohibits active involvement of the
VCC in the portfolio firm. VCC are only allowed to provide advice which also impacts
their risk management practices. Further one, a mixed method approach including, for
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example, surveys, verbal protocol analysis, and content analysis might be favorable to
explore aspects of formal and informal risk assessment in VC investments.
Furthermore, since our sample is limited to early stage VC funds, further investigations
into different fund stages might be of interest to explore the differences across
investment stages.
In terms of practice, we showed that all VCC in our sample pursue comparable
risk management measures for the assessment and evaluation of new ventures, in
contracting as well as in governance issues. Looking at the descriptive statistics we
observed that particularly governance mechanisms, liquidation preferences and partially
assessment and evaluation measures are extensively applied by VCC in their ventures in
our data set. Nevertheless, there mechanisms do not show a significant influence on
failure risk, which might be explained by the fact that they act like hygiene factors. Our
study provides empirical evidence for the great importance of investment manager´s
experience and skills which could be understand as the motivator of the analyzed risk
management. Considering our empirical results, LPs and VC funds should therefore
rely on highly experienced employees managing ventures. The results suggest that VCC
have to invest in their human capital to improve the skills and knowledge of their
investment managers as well as the working environment and conditions to hire the
best investment managers. In that course, an exchange between more experienced and
younger investment managers triggered by the VCC might be a possibility to achieve a
knowledge transfer.
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APPENDIX A:
Table 4. Overview of academic work on risk management in VC-backed ventures from 2005-2015
Reference

Sample

Data collection method

Data analysis method

Bamford and Douthett
(2013)

Initial public offerings
(IPO)
n = 545

Investors Daily Digest
and Barron´s

Descriptive statistics
Logistic regression
OLS estimation

Bengtsson and Sensoy
(2010)

Private partnership VCs

Private Consulting firm
VCExperts

Descriptive statistics

n = 646
Start-up companies

Kruskal-Wallis test

n = 1,266

Probit regression

Investment rounds

OLS regression

n = 1,534
Cumming et al. (2005)

Correlations

Investment rounds
n = 18,774

Heckman-Sorensen Index
VentureExpert

Descriptive statistics
Logit regression
Poisson regression
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Comparison of
proportions and means
tests
Correlations

Hopp (2010)

Capital contributions
n = 2,373 (961 ventures
and 437 VCCs)

Thomson Venture
Economics

Descriptive statistics
Correlations
Logistic regression

Hopp and Lukas (2014)

VC investments
n= 2,373 in Germany

Public sources and
Thomson Venture
Economics

Descriptive statistics
Correlation matrix
Weibull duration model
Heckman type selection
model

Kut et al. (2007)

Venture capital and buyout funds

Survey

Descriptive statistics
Mann-Whitney test

n = 142
Kut et al. (2006)

Venture capital and buyout funds

Pearson chi-square test
Survey

Descriptive statistics
Mann-Whitney test

n = 142

Pearson chi-square test
Logit regression
OLS regression

Kut and Smolarski (2006)

Private equity funds
n = 33 from Germany and
France
n = 21 from India

Survey

Descriptive statistics
Mann Whitney test
Pearson Chi-square test

LiPuma and Park (2014)

Invested rounds
n = 962
VC-backed technology
companies
n = 334

InfoUSA´s CorpTech
data

Descriptive statistics

Lu et al. (2006)

VC firms
n = 34

Questionnaire survey
EDB and AVCJ

Descriptive statistics
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
Correlations
Two-sided Pearson chisquare
Hierarchical regression

Maula et al. (2009)

Technology-based firms
n = 91

Venture Economics
Database
Survey

Descriptive statistics
Correlations
Standardized factor
loadings
Goodness of fit statistics

Ning et al. (2015)

Venture investments and
deals

Money Tree Report from
PriceWaterhouseCoopers/
National Venture Capital
Association using data
from Thomson Reuters

Descriptive statistics

n = 68

Pearson Correlations
GLS regression
Poisson regression

Correlations
Multiple regression
models
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Payne et al.
(2009)

VC firms

Survey

n = 26
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Descriptive statistics

VC investors

Varimax Rotated Factor
Loadings

n = 52

Correlations
GLS regression
Multivariate regression

Pbrimah O, Prakash P
(2010)

VC firms
n = 584

Jay Ritter´s
VentureXpert

Descriptive statistics
Tobit regression
OLS regression
Variance-covariance
matrix

Smolarski et al. (2005)

Private equity funds

Survey

Descriptive statistics

Tan et al. (2008)

n = 32 from UK

Mann-Whitney test

n = 21 from India

Pearson chi-square test

VC firms

Survey

Descriptive statistics

VentureXpert
Alliances database

Descriptive statistics
Correlations
Regression analysis (OLS,
negative binomal model)

n = 53
Wang et al. (2012)

VC-backed companies
n = 1,757 (772 reporting
sales information)
Financing rounds
n = 5,896 (1,757 VCbacked companies)

APPENDIX B:
Table 5. Descriptive statistics
Mean

Std.
Dev

Scale

Data Source

HR risk

3.200

1.317

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Liquidity risk

3.652

1.152

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Market risk

3.311

1.304

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Technology risk

2.711

1.455

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Expert assessment

3.795

0.915

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

IP protection

3.435

1.424

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

References of technology

3.806

1.002

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment

Failure risk

Assessment and evaluation
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managers

References of founders

4.086

0.686

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Liquidation preference

4.096

0.990

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Number of syndication
partners

2.568

1.975

Metric

Term sheet

Investment sum

436,169

206,874

Metric (Euros)

Investment committee papers

Working experience

3.311

0.932

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Founding experience

3.237

0.993

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Technology expertise

3.355

0.842

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Business skills

3.946

0.578

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Network size

3.720

0.851

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Milestones

4.247

0.789

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Information through network

4.323

0.710

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Reporting

4.355

0.653

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Shares of Founder

83.30

8.830

Per cent

Term sheet

Personal exchange

4.323

0.710

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Support with competence

3.554

0.881

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Support with sales

2.681

0.987

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Support with technology

2.304

1.117

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Support with strategy

3.839

0.664

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Support with follow-up
financing

4.065

1.046

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment
managers

Use of network

3.785

0.900

Rating from 1 to 5

Survey with investment

Contracting

Investment manager
experience and skills

Governance

Management support
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managers
Control
Age

4.598

2.086

Metric

Business Plan

Industry – IT

0.385

0.473

Binary

Investment committee papers

Industry – Life Science

0.344

0.463

Binary

Investment committee papers

Industry – Material Science

0.098

0.177

Binary

Investment committee papers

Industry – Energy

0.057

0.108

Binary

Investment committee papers

Industry –
Telecommunication

0.041

0.079

Binary

Investment committee papers

Industry – Other

0.090

0.164

Binary

Investment committee papers

APPENDIX C:
In table 6, the Fornell-Lacker criterion is shown. The table shows the latent
variable correlation. In the diagonal the square root of the AVE can be found. This
value should be higher than all values below and left in the table to pass the
discriminant validity. This is the case for our model.
Table 6. Fornell-Lacker Criterion
Failure risk

Assessment
and
evaluation

Contracting

Investment
manager
experience
and skills

Failure risk

0.735

Assessment
and
evaluation

0.225

1.000

Contracting

0.361

0.214

1.000

0.130

-0.158

0.715

Investment
manager
experience
and skills

-

Governance

Management
support

0.183

Governance

0.201

0.298

0.435

-0.050

0.777

Management
support

0.383

0.304

-0.416

0.197

0.641

1.000

In table 7, the cross loadings of each item in our PLS model are shown. Each
variable should load highest on its corresponding construct. Then, the discriminant
validity test is passed. This is the case in our model.
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Table 7. Cross-Loadings
Failure risk

Assessment
and
evaluation

Contracting

Investment
manager
experience
and skills

Governance

Management
support

HR risk

0.624

0.006

0.019

-0.199

-0.126

0.046

Liquidity risk

0.775

0.105

0.338

-0.222

0.184

0.245

Market risk

0.701

0.297

0.353

0.071

0.241

0.339

Technology
risk

0.823

0.212

0.259

-0.202

0.187

0.380

0.234

1.000

0.214

0.130

0.298

0.304

0.361

0.214

1.000

-0.158

0.435

0.416

Working
experience

-0.137

0.177

-0.080

0.797

0.127

0.290

Founding
experience

-0.159

0.078

-0.256

0.705

-0.292

-0.174

Network size

-0.110

-0.018

0.007

0.623

0.096

0.291

Technology
expertise

-0.106

0.123

-0.068

0.722

-0.001

0.261

Milestones

0.227

0.161

0.414

-0.056

0.883

0.476

Information
through
network

0.098

0.349

0.181

0.015

0.663

0.577

Reporting

0.114

0.304

0.366

-0.055

0.770

0.541

0.383

0.304

0.416

0.197

0.641

1.000

Failure risk

Assessment
and
evaluation
Evaluation
Contracting
Liquidation
Investment
manager
experience
and skills

Governance

Management
support
Use
network

of
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In table 8, the heterortrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT) is shown. If
the HTMT is below 0.900 discriminant validity has been established between two
constructs. This is the case for all of our items.
Table 8. Heterortrait-Monotrait Ratio Criterion
Failure risk

Assessment
and
evaluation

Contracting

Investment
manager
experience
and skills

Governance

Failure risk
Assessment
and
evaluation

0.249

Contracting

0.390

0.214

Investment
manager
experience
and skills

0.332

0.168

0.174

Governance

0.342

0.407

0.481

0.271

Management
support

0.407

0.304

0.416

0.430

0.797

Management
support

